Derivation of
There are three distinct cases to consider:
(i) Total turnout equals 3z; where z is a nonnegative integer.
(ii) Total turnout equals 3z + 1; where z is a nonnegative integer.
(iii) Total turnout equals 3z + 2; where z is a nonnegative integer.
If (i) holds, then k + l = 3z; where z is a nonnegative integer, and
If (ii) holds, then k + l = 3z + 1; where z is a nonnegative integer, and
Finally, if (iii) holds, then k + l = 3z + 2; where z is a nonnegative integer, and
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1 The …rst part of the proposition follows from Proposition 6 in Kartal (2013) . The proof of the second part is as follows. At a p = 0 equilibrium under MR,
However under PR,
As Krasa and Polborn (2009) has shown, there exists a unique equilibrium in a neighborhood of p = 0 under MR. Moreover, the equilibrium cuto¤s are continuous in p in that neighborhood. The same also holds under PR. Therefore for p su¢ ciently small, c
must hold. Now, assume towards a contradiction that M R P R all p small. The bene…t of voting to an B-supporter under PR is given by
On the other hand, the bene…t of voting to an B-supporter under MR is given by
Assume that k denotes the realized number of voters. There are four cases to consider:
Case (i): Assume that k 3. Under PR, the bene…t of voting to an B-supporter when total turnout is k multiplied by the probability that turnout is k is larger than
The term
is greater than the term
A ) and M R P R for all p su¢ ciently small by hypothesis. The term inside the parantheses
is strictly positive for all p su¢ ciently close to 0 for every integer k > 2 because F (c M R A ) is multiplied by p: Hence for all p su¢ ciently small, the bene…t of voting to a B-supporter with a turnout of k multiplied by the probability that turnout is k is strictly greater under PR for all k 3:
The bene…t of voting to a B-supporter with zero turnout (k = 0) multiplied by the probability that turnout is 0 is larger under PR. This is true because (1 M R )
by the initial hypothesis.
Case (iii): The bene…t of voting to a B-supporter with k = 1 multiplied by the probability that k = 1 is larger under PR than under MR for p su¢ ciently small. If k = 1, then
is larger than zero for p su¢ ciently close to 0, since F (c
A ) for all p su¢ ciently small, and lim p!1 F (c
Case (iv): Because the lowest possible cost is 0, c A;n and c B;n converge to 0 and the expected turnout n n converges to in…nity as n goes to in…nity under both PR and MR (see Kartal (2013) ). The bene…t of voting with k = 2 multiplied by the probability that k = 2 is n 1 2
whereas the bene…t of voting under PR is higher than
But for …xed, large n; the term
is positive if p is su¢ ciently small because the term in parantheses converges to a positive number as p goes to 0. If n is su¢ ciently large and p is su¢ ciently small, the term F (c
A ) is very small, because it converges to zero as n goes to in…nity. Hence, the bene…t of voting with k = 2 multiplied by the probability that k = 2 is strictly higher under PR.
These four cases show that if M R P R all small p then the bene…t of voting for an A-supporter is strictly higher under PR, i.e., c Proposition 15 shows that the probability that party B wins goes to one as the electorate size goes to in…nity, provided that f (0) > 0. On the other hand, Proposition 14 shows that if f (0) > 0; then the share of party A in power is bounded below away from zero under PR in large electorates. As a result, if f (0) > 0; then the share of the minority in power is strictly higher under PR in su¢ ciently large electorates.
Rule Utilitarian Model
The model builds on Coate and Conlin (2004) allowing the voting system to be either PR or MR (Coate and Conlin (2004) analyze only MR). The fraction of supporters of A is the realization of a random variable that is distributed according to a beta distribution, and this is common knowledge. The probability density function of this random variable is
where v and w are known by citizens and B(v; w) is the Beta function
The expected fraction of A-supporters under this distributional assumption is v=(v +w): Voting is costly and costs are distributed according to a uniform distribution on [0,1]. Individuals follow the voting rule that, if followed by everyone else on their side, would maximize their side's aggregate utility. For both side, the optimal voting rule is a cuto¤ cost level below which an individual should vote. Let the cuto¤ costs for the two groups be denoted by and : Party A wins under MR if
because in this case turnout for party A is greater than turnout for B. This is equivalent to
Since supporters of A (B) are group rule-utilitarian, ( ) maximizes the aggregate expected utility of supporters of A (B) given ( ): Let H = 1 and L = 1. Then the aggregate expected utility of supporters of A is given by
whereas the aggregate expected utility of supporters of B is given by because in this case turnout for party A is greater than two times the turnout for B. This is equivalent to
Both parties win one seat each if
This is equivalent to
Then the aggregate expected utility of A-supporters under PR is given by
whereas the aggregate expected utility of B-supporters is given by
Under both rules the cuto¤ cost ( ) maximizes the aggregate expected utility of supporters of A (B) given ( ):
The graph below shows turnout rates under PR and MR (on the vertical axis) as a function of w=(v + w); the expected fraction of B-supporters:
Purple: MR Blue: PR
The term w=(v + w) ranges from 0:5 to 1. Between 0:5 and a threshold level, the minority is su¢ ciently large and MR generates higher turnout than PR. For su¢ ciently high levels of w=(v + w), minority is small and it is PR that generates higher turnout. These are consistent with Proposition 1 and Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the share of the minority in power is higher under PR for any w=(v + w) 2 [0:5; 1); which is consistent with Proposition 2 and Hypothesis 2.
